Course: Philosophy

Field of Study: Internal Security

Form of classes and number of hours: lecture 30 h

Number of ECTS credits: 2

Learning outcomes:

Student:

knows and understands rudimentary terms and concepts in the field of philosophy,

- has knowledge of contemporary worldview issues,
- is aware of the essential problems of axiology, ethics,
- knows the views of prominent thinkers,
- can assess the main trends in the theory of social sciences,
- can interpret current social phenomena through the prism of categories in the philosophy of politics,
- can participate in the preparation of socio-political projects requiring in-depth knowledge.

Evaluation methods of learning outcomes:

Discussion and preparation of a short essay

Subject matter of the classes:

- 1. Main terms and concepts of philosophy.
- 2. Ancient Greek Political Philosophy.
- 3. Rome's socio-political science.
- 4. Fundamentals of political theology of Christianity.
- 5. Medieval philosophical and political thought.
- 6. Social and political doctrines in the 17th century.
- 7. Enlightenment ideas.
- 8. Contemporary trends in social and political philosophy.
- 9. Nationalist movements.
- 10. Social teaching of the Catholic Church.
- 11. Liberalism.
- 12. Conservatism.
- 13. Socialist thought.
- 14. Contemporary trends in social and political philosophy.

Bibliography

Books

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Darwall, S. (ed.), (2003). Virtue Ethics. Oxford: B. Blackwell.

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Websites

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-ancient/#9
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.rep.routledge.com/
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/

Others

https://philpapers.org/browse/social-and-political-philosophy

https://www.virtuescience.com/nicomachean-ethics.html

Introduction to virtue ethics and its social and political implications in ancient and modern philosophy

Happiness and virtue

The central problem of human life is the question about happiness. How to be happy? It does not matter if you are rich or poor, if you are young or old, if you are European or Chinese, if someone lived in the antiquity, in the XVI century or if someone is living now. Although everyone wants to be happy, it is not simple, because happiness is not the same as beauty, richness, fame or health. It is rather the proper relationship to these **things** which we are striving for. If the happiness depended on these elements, their disappearance would mean the loss of it. Consider this example, a rich man's happiness would be being rich. But people with no money are happy, too. Hence, happiness is not equal to richness. Happiness is something more than that. Happiness, as ancient philosophers noted, is related to the issue of a good life that cannot be led alone or in the isolation of a particular community. The basic dimension of human life is a social dimension, which in turn is related to social practices and virtues that regulate human action.

Being-in-the-world as well-being

According to Heidegger, man, in the moral sense, exists 'in the world' not in the abstract sense (of the whole of being), but in a specific sense – a socially, temporally, spatially and culturally defined sphere of relationships. Each of the forms of relationships (roles) is also related to specific duties: therefore, analogically to 'I think, therefore I am', we can say 'I am, and therefore I shall/should'. I am already in a moral situation, I coexist with other people for whom I am responsible, but also who are responsible for me (family, neighbourly, professional, friendly, colleague, local, national, cultural ties). We are always in the world in a certain way (X, being a man is not a woman, being a Pole is not a German, being a lecturer, not an astronaut). We are bound to our way of being and our proper responsibilities (the lecturer prepares for lectures, not for a flight to the moon). Socrates' 'being-in-the-world' meant being in Athens in the 5th century BC, in a moral and political crisis, which determined his life task. St. Paul's 'being-in-the-world' meant Judaism at the time of the birth of Christianity, a struggle against Christianity (purging Judaism of heresy), and then, after conversion, the evangelisation of the pagans. Jagiełło's 'being-in-the-world' - he was one of the famous Polish kings and won one of the biggest battle in the Middle ages in Europe (1410) meant firstly Lithuania, and then, united by a personal union, the Crown (Poland Kingdom) and Lithuania, in the face of a common threat from the Teutonic Order. We define 'being-in-the-world' by answering the question 'Who am I?', And therefore 'Where do I live?', 'What do I do?', 'What do I strive for?' 'Who are my friends?', etc. The answers make the existence of man more specific, revealing his uniqueness and a specific set of social roles and responsibilities. Since X is a son or daughter, he or she has parents whom he or she should respect. Since X is a Pole, he or she should cherish the virtue of patriotism, respect tradition and care for the good of the country. If he is an older brother, then he should be responsible for younger siblings (good example, support, bond building). Each role (relationship) determines the circle of responsibility: the wider it is, the less binding it is and contains fewer responsibilities (parents are obliged to raise their children and then to influence the environment in which they live and work; an adult child should take care of parents who require care, starting with their parents). 'Being-in-the-world' is a stable and personal, i.e. non-instrumental (not focused on own benefit) being together with others. Isolation, violation or total breaking of a personal relationship lead a person to a distortion of the personal being (defects) or to self-destruction (addictions, consumerism, perversions), autoagression (see the so-called "Dostoyevsky's suicides" – Stavrogin, Svidrygajłow, Smierdyakow).

Origins and tradition of virtue ethics

The philosophical concept of the virtue has been developed in the ancient Greece. For the philosophers the original point of view was the political community of citizens and their pursuit for excellence in the political practice. For this reason the first subject of a philosophical reflection were such virtues as courage, justice, self-control, continence, moderation. The meaning of virtue is encoded in the traditional ethos (city-states – Ancient Greece), in the practice of everyday life, in recognised values and rules of conduct (morality), which thanks to intellectual procedures are refined ('ennobled').

The virtue ethics has a long tradition. As I already mentioned, it has been created by Socrates, Aristotle, Plato, and continued by the other ancient philosophers like Epicurean and the Stoics. The decline of the system of city-states caused the happiness and virtues to be associated with independence from the political and social life. The Christianity introduced new virtues like love, mercy, poverty and humility, which were conceptualised by St. Augustine and St. Thomas. The American Founding Fathers like Madison, Jefferson, and Washington referred to the concept of the political virtues. The so-called 'aretaic turn' has occurred since the 50's of the twentieth century, whose the most important representatives are Alasdair McIntyre and Martha Nussbaum.

Virtues and goods

Each role is associated with the corresponding virtues, enabling its full implementation, e.g. motherhood with tenderness, care for the home and household members, gentleness, thrift and responsibility. Disadvantages, in turn, introduce limitations in its implementation, e.g. irresponsibility in being a superior, group or team leader. Every society needs good mothers, good politicians, good carpenters, mechanics and cooks. They teach the proper achievement, use and manufacture of goods.

Virtues schematise human action in relation to goods such as health, success, power, property, family. They enable the achievement of these goods (e.g. bravery, perseverance, rationality, economy), their proper use (moderation, prudence) and combination with other goods (patriotism, love, responsibility, loyalty, friendship). Regarding the question of happiness posed above, we can clearly see that, first of all, people often associate happiness with inferior goods that pass quickly, such as pleasure or beauty, or pursue goods based on vices, such as ruthlessness, anger.

According to the classical point of view every virtue is based, on the one hand, on the intellectual activity of an apt recognition of the best way to act. On the other hand, it is related to a habit, which is the emotional and practical way of achieving good. The particular virtue bounds the natural inclination with the suitable good or goods. This ability is called by Aristotle a 'phronesis' – practical wisdom, which helps us to avoid extremes, like the excess of something and the deficiency of something else. The virtue is also the right measure in every activity.

Two exercises in virtue ethics

This co-relationship will be discussed on the basis of one of a few examples. As can be seen at the top of the table, there are four categories: natural inclinations, goods, vices and virtues (Tab. 1). The natural inclination is, for example, a sexual desire which should lead to such goods as family, having children, pleasure, expression of love, closeness and endearment. Realisation of these goods is not possible if someone has no tendency to make love. The permanent possession of these goods or achieving some of these goods is not possible too if someone does not control his

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or her own sexual desire and practice free love. As a result, such a person hurts others and oneself in terms of both health and relationships. Finally, we have got two vices: the profligacy and the frigidity. To achieve the above-mentioned goods, we need virtues like: continence, loyalty, abstinence, self-control.

Natural inclinations	Goods	Vices Drawbacks Disadvantages	Virtues
Sexual desire	Pleasure Children Closeness Expression of love Family	Profligacy (Excess) Frigidity (Lack, deficiency, absence)	Continence, Moderation, Abstinence, Loyalty

Table 1. Semantic field of the virtues of self-control and moderation in the context of sexual desire. The concept of the table was prepared on the basis of 'Eudemian Ethics' (Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, transl. and ed. B. Inwood and R. Woolf, Cambridge 2013, pp. 19-25).

The distinction of vices is the first step in analysing the content of the concept of virtues. This reasoning can be carried out in the case of the virtue of bravery (courage) (Tab. 2), combining it with the content analysis of this concept. Without courage, it is impossible to obtain goods that are very essential to human life. The realisation of these goods includes risk, the threat of losing other goods, such as health, life, property, peace and security. Although this virtue was originally shaped in warrior societies and its importance was associated with military and civic activities, it did not lose its meaning in the changed social context. It enables the achievement of goals in unfavourable life circumstances, taking up difficult challenges, overcoming one's own weaknesses, development, and defending people and values.

Natural inclinations	Goods	Vices Drawbacks Disadvantages	Virtues
Daring Aggressiveness Resoluteness	Realisation of risky goals Defense of persons, properties, values Development	Recklessness (E) audacity Fear, cowardice (L)	Courage Bravery

Table 2. Semantic field of bravery

Very often this virtue is confused with resoluteness, understood as the lack of fear of danger. However, not being afraid means losing the ability to be thoughtful by caring for yourself and for others. However, courage is a special, demanding sacrifice, expression of this concern. The disadvantage, therefore, is not the fear itself, but the way it is correlated with resoluteness, which deprives it of a decisive role in shaping human action, which we call cowardice. On the other hand, courage is sometimes associated with audacity, ruthlessness and bravado. Bravery, as can be seen in the diagram below, is situated between an excess of fear (cowardice) and an excess of resoluteness (reckless). It needs an appropriate correlation of resoluteness and fear. It requires additional moral qualities. Among them, the basic roles are played by: self-control, setting limits for fear and courage, as well as prudence that allows to properly recognise the situation, assess the reality and consequences of possible types of action, and make the right decision (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. Determining the content of the concept of bravery on the basis of the analysis of its opposites. The diagram was developed on the basis of 'Eudemian Ethics' (Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, transl. and ed. B. Inwood and R. Woolf, Cambridge 2013, pp. 41-47).

Then, too, the underlying courage does not turn into audacity and irresponsibility, as well as unnecessary heroism. Courage is not just about showing resoluteness, about being fearless, but about achieving the good that is necessary for a good life. It consists, as Aristotle argued, in a constant and rational relationship with the good: 'Courage is in conformity with reason, and reason bids us choose what is fine. That is why one who endures fearful things without this being due to reason has either abandoned his senses or is reckless. Only one who is fearless on account of what is fine is also courageous. So the coward is afraid even of what one ought not to fear, while the reckless person is confident even where one ought not to be. But the courageous person is as one ought to be in both respects, and in this way is a mean, since he has confidence and fear just as reason bids. But reason does not bid him endure what is greatly painful and destructive unless it is fine. The reckless person is confident about such things even if reason does not bid so; the coward fails to be so even if it does. The brave person is only so if it does' (Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, p. 43). Virtue is a kind of obedience to the rational part of the soul and it corresponds to the relationship of fatherhood, authority, in which what is less perfect follows what is more perfect (rational) (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, transl. and ed. R. Crisp, Cambridge 2004, p. 22).

Politics as problem of fatherhood

The figure of the father is the basic tool for process of civilising of human being, instilling in him the virtue of civility, respecting others – strangers and setting himself/herself clear boundaries. The experience of the common world is built on crossing the sphere of intimacy, privacy (subjective experience of the world, focused on one's own needs, experiences and feelings), control and mastery of one's own desires and recognition of the diversity of social actors belonging to different primary communities. The original metaphors for describing public space (city, state, politics) are theatre and play (theatrum mundi): in the public sphere people play roles, therefore they go beyond themselves (their desires, feelings). They also become visible to others, they cannot isolate themselves on the stage of the world. Civilisation (city) grows by recognising

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an alien as a partner: "City" and "civility" have a common root etymologically. Civility is treating others as though they were strangers and forging a social bond upon that social distance. The city is that human settlement in which strangers are most likely to meet. The public geography of a city is civility institutionalised' (R. Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man*, London 2002, p. 264). The figure of the father institutionalises the individual, introducing him to the system of social rules, in which he is not the most important person and in which what matters are not so much his feelings as real actions. This figure forms institutional maturity, while being at the same time its image. 'The act of institution is — as Bourdieu explains — thus an act of communication, but of a particular kind: it *signifies* to someone what his identity is, but in the way that both it expresses it to him and imposes it on him by expressing it in front of everyone (*kategorein*, meaning originally, to accuse publicity) and thus informing him in an authoritative manner of what he is and what he must be' P. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, transl. G. Raymond, M. Adamson, Cambridge 1991, p. 121). The institutional position puts a man in the role of acting 'on behalf of the father', representing the supra-individual order of authority in which the son moves to the position of the father.

Tragedy and virtues

In order to put the discourse of virtue ethics in proper perspective, let us apply the genealogical interpretive procedure. The problematic horizon of virtue ethics is formed in confrontation with the world of myth and its antinomies presented by the tragedy. The Greek tragedy is a theory of a conflict based on the lack of authority – fatherhood (spiritual, institutional), the realisation of the good connected with the striving to achieve it without moderation, as well as the lack of emotional control. The old, heroic ethos of shame becomes inadequate to the requirements of functioning in a civic society based on a compromise. In the heroic ethos, concession is a sign of weakness, a violation of the values that give meaning to life.

The conflict between Laius and Oedipus, which ends in a patricide, is organised by mutual hybris, violence and tenacity of the father and son ('Oedipus The King'). The conflict between Antigone and Creon results from the extension of the prerogatives of political power to the body of the deceased and his exclusion from the human community ('Antigone'). Aias' suicide is the result of the offence he suffered from Agamemnon and Menelaus, who granted Achilles' armor not to him, but to Odysseus. The offended hero is blinded by hatred to such a degree that he kills a herd of cattle instead of enemies. Then, unable to bear the ridicule, he commits suicide. In the tragedy about the archer Philoctet ('Philoclet'), both ethea are confronted with each other in extreme forms. Philoctet, after being bitten by a snake that leaves a rotting and incurable wound, is abandoned on a desert island by comrades heading to Troy. Years later, it turns out that victory cannot be achieved without the bow, which is to be stolen by Achilles' son. On the one hand, we have the hero, who is abandoned, bitter and hungry for revenge, on the other hand, Odysseus, subordinates all human relations to victory. Euripides' 'Bacchae' reverses the relationship between the new and the old ethos, showing that the civic ethos should be characterised by the ability to assimilate the values of tradition. Meanwhile, the ruler of Thebes, Pentheus, rejects the cult of Dionysus, who, although appearing as a new deity, but rejected from the position of the authority of power and the authority of reason.

Moral qualities are present in the above-mentioned characters, they also have their reasons, but their reasons and aspirations, and even individual virtues, are not integrated by the basic ones which is why in tragic situations their vices reveal themselves, and thus they take extreme solutions. Going beyond a tragic conflict, its insolubility and reproducibility, this is possible through the ethics of virtues, which depend on the figure of the incorporeal father and the incorporeal

filiation of man (belonging to the immaterial, eternal order of meaning). In relation to it, what occurs is a transformation of the natural attitude towards the world: the pursuit of goods and their permanent possession are possible when acting in coordination with the virtues – self-control, moderation, justice, meekness, generosity. In this perspective, a tragic situation – let us consider it as a an example of a conflict of goods, values, attitudes, and aspirations – does not have to lead to a tragic end, and therefore a lack of understanding, mutual destruction and the breakdown of interpersonal ties. The father figure introduces a person to a discursive procedure aimed at achieving the good in such a way that avoids extreme solutions. This puts Socrates, as the father figure of virtue ethics and rationalism, in close relationship with Apollo, who commanded self-knowledge, maintaining moderation, and rejecting pride.

European culture and the fatherhood genealogy

In this perspective, Western European philosophy and culture can be understood as an overlap of genealogical lines of paternity that lead man beyond tragedy, beyond what is demonic and orgiastic by re-establishing the relationship of discursive paternity, moving the mother's son to the position of father's son, to the position of responsibility. We can name a few examples of fatherhood, characterising the founding fathers and the associated orders of meanings: Orestes, who kills his mother, separates himself from the primacy of the law of family revenge, a relationship of blood in favour of a relationship involving linguistic-volitional relation; Aeneas, who loses his wife in the burning city of Troy, and at the same time saves his father and son, hence, he maintains and transforms his identity, becoming the founder of Rome; Abraham, whose name expresses a new identity, because, unlike his father, he obeys God's call to travel to Canaan, becoming at the same time the father of many nations and the father of faith; Socrates transforming bodily eroticism into the pursuit of learning ideas and shaping virtues; Christ revealing God as a merciful Father and through his sacrifice establishing sonship in the Son of the divine Father.

Filiation occurs in the father-son matrix, where the father calls his son to commit sacrifice due to directness (attachment to place, desire, pleasure, life), while introducing his son into the order of intangible sense. In all discourses, fatherhood coincides with separation from what is given and originally binding, reformulation of humanity and the establishment of a new type of community. The father's action consists in reversing tradition, linking leadership and inheritance to priority birthdays. Thus, the figures of father and son combine Greek, Roman and Jewish origins of Europe, they are connected with each other – according to Pierre Legendre and Alain Badiou – in the St. Paul's universalism, or, more broadly, universal Christianity, based on incorporeal filiation of man.

Leader (institutional father) as trustworthy guardian

For example, a good teacher is not said to be like that because he is famous or has a lot of knowledge, but because he is able to convey that knowledge, shape the character of students, their skills and understanding of the world. His fame is to be derived from good practice, and knowledge is meant to serve as a means of achieving it. Based on the professional exercise of his profession, he develops complementary virtues and wisdom in life.

This leads us to the original sense of human rationality, which is shaped within a specific sphere of cognition and action as well as in symbolic and institutional context: 'Reason is formed. Every human being is reason-able, but their capacity to reason must be formed. The formation or training [formation] of reason (Bildung) passes through disciplines. The disciplines through which reason is formed are themselves schools of thought' (B. Stiegler, States of Shock. Stupidity and

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Knowledge in the Twenty-First Century, transl. D. Ross, Cambridge 2015, p. 151). A good teacher is therefore able to assimilate professional and life experiences in such a way that, on the one hand, it raises the quality of his educational work and, on the other, his humanity. A good teacher is also a teacher who may be trusted by his student and the student can turn to him for advice.

He is the one who, by serving as an exmple, instils in the students the virtue of attentiveness, which also expresses the basic structure of each virtue, because they require focus on the pursuit of good and cooperation in its implementation with others. 'Attention is always both psychic and collective: "to be attentive to" means both "to focus on" and "to attend to". As such, the formation by schools of attention also consists in educating and elevating pupils [élèves]; in the sense of making them civil, that is, able to consider others and capable of taking care – of oneself and of that which is in oneself, as of that which is not oneself and of that which is not in oneself' (B. Stiegler, States of Shock. Stupidity and Knowledge in the Twenty-First Century, p. 152).

The figure of the teacher is not accidental here — he is an institutionalised, in the form of an educational system, example of the most important father figure, a guide, a master and a guardian in shaping humanity. 'Trustworthy guardians' — as Tadeusz Kotarbiński described the people transmitting and shaping good practices, i.e. practices of good work and good life — accompany human beings from birth to death. They are the persons one can rely on. Fatherhood, as it is clearly seen in the master-student relationship, has the capacity for social and discursive reproduction: the son/student becomes the father/master/teacher, thus ensuring the continuity of skills, knowledge and life wisdom.

Conclusions

In conclusion, it must be said that the virtue ethics presupposes the human nature which is common to all people. The meaning of the particular virtue depends on few features: the cultural and social context, sex, age, property, intellectual level, and so on. But the most important thing that the virtue ethics point out is that we can achieve the well-being only by complying with moderation. One can achieve happiness by being together, living in a society that has a just polity and rational individuals. The socio-political contextualisation of virtues was the premise of the Platonic concept of the ideal state and the Aristotelian concept of polytheia.

Tasks and exercises:

- 1. List and describe the virtues and flaws of the selected literary hero.
- 2. Describe your 'being-in-the-world' (age, nationality, family, living place, friends) and the virtues which are connected with this status.
- 3. Using the model presented above (Table 1-2.), describe the selected inclination, pointing to the related goods, virtues and disadvantages (e.g. tendency to rest or eating, sociability, empathy).
- 4. Which of the virtues should characterise a statesman?
- 5. Who are your trustworthy guardians and what qualities do they have?
- 6. Please listen to the recordings below, prepare short notes, and then complete the table below (also using other internet resources).

a) Machiavelli's Advice For Nice Guys

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GTQInmWCPgA

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niccol%C3%B2 Machiavelli

b) POLITICAL THEORY – Thomas Hobbes

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9i4jb5XBX5s

c) POLITICAL THEORY - John Locke

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZiWZJgJT7I

d) POLITICAL THEORY – Jean-Jacques Rousseau

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=81KfDXTTtXE

Philosopher	Date of birth and death, the most important works	The nature of man (what is man) and the state of nature	Society (how it arises, what are its functions)	The essence and functions of the state (law)
Niccolo				
Machiavelli				
Thomas Hobbes				
John Locke				
Jean-Jacques Rousseau				

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